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A B S T R A C T
Unexpected events provide us with opportunities for learning about what to expect from the world around us.
Using a saccadic-planning paradigm, we investigated whether and how infants and adults represent the statistics
of a changing environment (i.e. build an internal model of the environment). Participants observed diﬀerently
colored bees that appeared at an unexpected location every few trials. The color cues indicated whether the
subsequent bees would appear at this new location (i.e. update trials) or at the same location as previously (i.e.
no-update trials). Infants learned the predictive value of the color cues and updated their internal models when
necessary. Unlike infants, adults had a tendency to update their models each time they observed a change in the
structure. We argue that infants are open to learning from current evidence due to being less inﬂuenced by their
prior knowledge. This is an advantageous learning strategy to form accurate representations in dynamic en-
vironments, which is fundamental for successful adaptation.
1. Introduction
Learning is the process that allows organisms to construct and
modulate an internal model of the outside world for eﬃcient func-
tioning (Friston, 2010; Picard & Friston, 2014). Surprising events
challenge one’s current model of the world, as they often demand ad-
justments in predictions generated by these models (O’Reilly, 2013;
O’Reilly et al., 2013). Here, we used a saccadic planning task to in-
vestigate whether and how infants and adults form internal models that
represent the statistics of a dynamic environment and adjust their
models when confronted with changes.
Maintaining an accurate representation of the world is a challenge
for learners especially in environments that change over time.
Surprising or unexpected events signaling change render old informa-
tion irrelevant to the present state of the world, often making one’s
previous models of the environment obsolete (Courville, Daw, &
Touretzky, 2006). This would then promote more learning, as internal
models would be adjusted to represent the outside world accurately
(Courville et al., 2006; Payzan-LeNestour & Bossaerts, 2011).
O’Reilly et al. (2013) investigated how humans update their internal
models in a changing environment and whether a normative Bayesian
learner model could explain this process. Using fMRI and a saccadic
planning paradigm, they presented adults with targets on a circle that
changed location in every few trials. The ﬁrst trial in which the targets
appeared at a new location were called “update trials”. After “update
trials”, the targets continued to appear around the same area for a
couple of trials (i.e. expected trials). In some of the trials, the targets
appeared at a new location on the circle for once (i.e. one-oﬀ trials);
however, in the following trials the targets were presented around the
same area as in the immediately preceding trials. Although the sudden
appearances of the targets at new locations were unexpected in both
“update” and “one-oﬀ” trials, participants were required to update their
models in the update trials, but not in one-oﬀ trials, as the targets
continued to appear at this new location only after the update trials.
Data revealed activation in the parietal cortex when an immediate
motor response was programmed as the location of the targets were
unexpectedly changed in both trial types. However, the anterior cin-
gulate cortex was speciﬁcally active only when participants updated
their internal models to accommodate the information about the new
location of the targets. In summary, these ﬁndings show that when the
uncertainty about the parameters of the environment increases, adults
adjust their internal models to represent the statistics of the outside
world accurately.
Similarly, for eﬃcient functioning, developing systems should not
only detect changes but also use this information to adapt their internal
models of the world. There is ample evidence in the developmental
literature showing that even human fetuses and newborn infants detect
changes and respond to deviations from regularities (Draganova et al.,
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2005; Partanen et al., 2013; Sambeth et al., 2009). However, whether
and how developing systems go beyond change detection and use sur-
prising information to learn needs further investigation.
Stahl and Feigenson (2015) explored surprise-driven learning in
human infants. Using a behavioral paradigm, they showed that 11-
month-old infants explored objects more often and learned new func-
tions of the objects more rapidly, when these objects were presented
previously in situations that disconﬁrmed their expectations about core
knowledge in physics (i.e. knowledge about physical rules that is al-
ready present prior to learning). Although this study demonstrates that
unexpected events enhance further learning, it is not clear how infants
form expectations based on surprising information. Because core
knowledge is assumed to be already present very early on in life, the
important question of whether and how infants use unexpected in-
formation to generate internal models to make predictions remains
unanswered. Do they, for example, use each unexpected information to
build an internal model? Alternatively, do they dissociate between
unexpected information in the extent to which they are relevant for
modulating predictions?
Previous research has shown that an infant brain is capable of
forming internal models to make predictions. In a functional near in-
frared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study using an omission paradigm,
Emberson, Richards, and Aslin (2015), have provided the ﬁrst evidence
that the predictive architecture of the brain is already present as early
as 6months. Emberson et al. (2015) demonstrated that after a learning
period, when images were unexpectedly omitted, infants showed acti-
vation in the occipital cortex, as if an image was presented, suggesting
that they generated predictions about the visual input. Importantly, this
activation was not observed, if omission was expected to happen. Using
EEG with a cross-modal cueing paradigm, Kouider et al. (2015) pro-
vided further evidence that infants formed predictions as a result of
learning associations between auditory cues and visual categories, and
their neural responses were diﬀerentially regulated based on the prior
knowledge they acquired. Whereas early components were ampliﬁed
for valid cues, late components, such as positive slow wave (PSW), were
enhanced for invalid targets. These studies together suggest that the
infant brain is already capable of forming predictions based on prior
knowledge and sensory activity is modulated by the violations of these
predictions. Although these studies provide initial evidence on the
predictive nature of the infant brain, it remains unknown whether in-
fants, like adults, dynamically update their internal models in response
to changes in the environment.
We used a saccadic planning paradigm, similar to O’Reilly et al.
(2013), to address three fundamental points. First, we investigated
whether and how infants and adults construct an internal model of a
changing environment that would then allow them to make predictions.
Second, we examined whether infants and adults dissociate between
unexpected information in the extent to which they are relevant for
updating predictions, as it would be ineﬃcient to adjust predictions
with respect to irrelevant changes. Third, we asked whether infants and
adults use diﬀerent strategies to generate and modulate their internal
models based on surprising information. Using the same procedure (i.e.
same paradigm, no instructions), we ensured that infants and adults
had similar prior information about the task speciﬁcs. We also tested
another group of adults with instructions.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty-nine 14-month-olds (M=14months 6 days, range:
13 months, 23 days-14months, 12 days, 18 girls) were recruited for the
study based on power analysis estimating a medium eﬀect size, as there
was no previous study using the same paradigm in infants. We con-
sidered the potential drop out in the power analysis given that this
phenomenon is commonly observed in infancy research. Because
previous studies show that by the end of their ﬁrst year of life, infants
advance in their statistical learning skills, we investigated infants at
14months of age (Saﬀran & Kirkham, 2018, for a review). Three infants
did not complete the eye-tracking calibration procedure and seven in-
fants were excluded during data processing because of failing to reach
the inclusion criteria (see data processing section). The ﬁnal sample
thus included twenty-nine infants (M=14months, 6 days, range:
13months, 27 days-14months, 12 days, 12 girls). Participants were
recruited from a database of volunteer families. Families received a
baby book or 10 Euros for their participation. All data from adult
participants were included in the analyses. Adult participants were
recruited from a database of university students (M=23.41 years,
SD=3.34 years, range 19–33 years, 36 female, 13 male). Adult parti-
cipants received gift cards of ﬁve Euros for their participation. The local
social science faculty’s ethical committee approved the study (approval
number: ECG2012-0910-058 DCC-NWO-EUea-Bekkering and
ECG2012-1301-006 Stapel/Hunnius).
2.2. Materials and procedure
The same stimuli were used for testing infants and adults. We used a
saccadic planning task in which we manipulated color and location of
target stimuli. Prior to the start of trials, we showed participants an
illustration of three diﬀerently colored bees on a garden background for
3000ms, as if the bees were ﬂying outdoors. Each trial started with an
image of target position holders on a circle. After 500ms, a ﬁxation
image (i.e. a sun image) appeared in the middle of the screen, which
remained visible for 1000ms (see Fig. 1). Following this, participants
observed diﬀerently colored bees that appeared on one of eight desig-
nated spots on the circle and stayed visible for 1500ms. One trial lasted
for a total duration of 3000ms, and the experiment consisted of 126
trials in total. The trials followed each other continuously as a movie
sequence rather than being presented as separate images. The entire
stimulus presentation took 6min and 18 s. An example stimulus video
can be found in the Supplementary Material.
The experiment consisted of 98 “expected” trials and 28 “surprise”
trials. There were two types of surprise trials that occurred with equal
frequencies: surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials. We used
color cues to indicate diﬀerent trials. Bees could appear in three dif-
ferent colors (see Fig. 1). We alternated between two colors to display
surprise/update and expected trials. The surprise/update trial bee al-
ways had a diﬀerent color from the ongoing expected trial series and
indicated the start of a new series of expected trials of that color. The
color of the surprise/no-update trial bee remained the same throughout
the experiment.
We manipulated the location of the bees in order to dissociate
surprise that demanded an update and surprise that did not demand an
update in predictions. In all surprise trials, the location (and color) of
the bee diﬀered from the previous trials. Participants were thus re-
quired to perform an eye movement to a new bee location, whereas in
expected trials, the bee location (and color) remained unchanged. The
two sorts of surprise trials diﬀered in the trials that followed them. The
surprise/update trials were the ﬁrst of a series of trials of the same kind
whereas the surprise/no-update trials were a one-oﬀ event with the
subsequent trials’ bee locations (and color) returning to what they had
been before. Therefore, after a surprise/update trial, the subsequent
bees continued to appear at the same location for on average four trials
and participants thus had to update their predictions about the location
of the bees. In the surprise/no-update trials, the location of the bee was
again surprising, as compared to the location of the previous one;
however, as this was a one-time event, participants were expected to not
change their predictions about the location of the following bees. In
expected trials, the bee appeared where it appeared in the previous
trial. Fig. 1 illustrates the paradigm.
Together with the ﬁxation image, a brief sound was played, and
with each bee image, a jump sound was played that slightly varied in
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pitch in order to keep infants’ attention on the stimuli. The colors of the
bees and associated sounds were counterbalanced across participants.
The trial order, target positions and the distance of the surprising tar-
gets from the previous targets were pseudo-randomized.
The stimulus materials were created using Psychopy (version
1.83.04) which were converted into movies in 1920× 1080 screen
resolution using the open source software Kazaam (version 1.4.5). The
stimuli were presented using Tobii Studio Software (3.3.0). Gaze data
were recorded at 120 Hz by a corneal reﬂection eye tracker (Tobii
TX300, Tobii Technology, Danderyd, Sweden) calibrated using a 9-
point procedure. The procedure was repeated if only seven or fewer
calibration points were detected. Adults were seated on a chair in front
of the eye-tracker screen and infants were seated in a baby seat placed
on their parents’ lap. All participants viewed the testing material from a
distance of 60 to 65 cm.
For infants, the experiment was ﬁnished when the trials ended or
the infant became fussy and stopped looking at the screen. All partici-
pants were monitored during the experiment via a built-in camera, but
only infant testing sessions were video-recorded. All adult participants
watched the entire stimulus presentation. In the second experiment,
adults did not receive any instructions about the task. This way, we
wanted to ensure that both infants and adults had the same amount of
Fig. 1. Screen snapshots for the diﬀerent stimulus types within a continuous sequence of trials.
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prior knowledge about the task speciﬁcs in order to robustly measure
age related diﬀerences in learning strategies within the experiment.
After the experiment, adult participants were asked whether they de-
tected any structure in the paradigm and their reports were written
down. Participants were debriefed afterwards.
2.2.1. Experiment with adults using instructions
We invited another group of adults for a third experiment in which
we gave them an information sheet about the task before they partici-
pated in the experiment. Participants were informed that targets (i.e.
diﬀerently colored bees) would appear on one of the eight designated
spots on the circle and a speciﬁc sound would accompany each target.
They were informed that mostly the targets appeared at the same lo-
cation for several trials in a row (i.e. expected trials). However, in some
trials, the targets appeared on a diﬀerent location on the circle (i.e.
surprise/update trials). When this happened, the color of the targets
would also change, so they knew that they should now expect targets to
appear at a diﬀerent location from what they had previously been ex-
pecting. They were further informed that, on some of the trials, the
targets would appear at random positions on the circle only once.
However, it is important to note that participants were not informed
about the speciﬁc location where they should expect the targets to
appear following surprise/no-update trials.
2.3. Data processing
We applied exactly the same protocol to process infant and adult
data for all experiments. We used the Tobii IV-T Fixation Filter to deﬁne
ﬁxations. Custom-made Python scripts (version 3.2) were used to pro-
cess the ﬁxation data. We deﬁned eight areas of interest (AOI) with 140-
pixel radius around each of the eight designated spots on the circle
(Fig. 2). We used ﬁxation latency as the dependent measure, which was
deﬁned as the latency between the appearance of the bee and the ﬁrst
ﬁxation in this AOI.
We ﬁrst segmented ﬁxation events for each trial window (i.e.
3000ms per trial). Minimum ﬁxation duration was set to 100ms and
ﬁxations below this value were disregarded. To ensure that gaze shifts
to the target were made from the central ﬁxation image, only trials
were included in which a valid ﬁxation was detected on the ﬁxation
image ﬁrst and then on the target AOI during the same trial window. In
order to account for the variability in the infant data, it was necessary
to deﬁne an individualized familiarization period for each participant.
For this, we targeted the ﬁrst valid surprise/update and surprise/no-
update trials for each participant, which included at least one expected
trial in between. This window was regarded as the “familiarization
phase” and values after this point were taken into account for the main
analyses. Participants who provided data for at least one more surprise/
update and surprise/no-update trial (separated by expected trials) be-
sides the familiarization phase were included in the ﬁnal sample (in-
fants: expected trials, M=37.62, SD=17.49; surprise/update trials
M=5.38, SD=2.68, surprise/no-update trials, M=4.45, SD=2.38).
For adults, this phase almost always corresponded to the initial trials in
the task (i.e. approximately the ﬁrst 8 trials), because adults registered
valid ﬁxations almost during the entire task. To remove outliers, we
disregarded ﬁxation latencies which were more than double the
average value and larger than 3 SDs from the mean (cf. O’Reilly et al.,
2013).
3. Results
We had clear predictions about the adults’ performance in the task
based on the previous research (cf. O’Reilly et al., 2013) and examined
whether infants would already show similar pattern of responses. As
shown in Fig. 3, we predicted that participants would be slower per-
forming an eye movement to surprising targets because in these trials
the targets appeared at a location that was diﬀerent from the previous
trials, which required re-programming of the eye movement response
resulting in increased ﬁxation latencies. If participants learned the
structure of the experiment and diﬀerentially represented the predictive
value of the color cues, we expected them to look at the target locations
in the trials following surprising trials (i.e. trials +1, +2, +3 and so
forth) signiﬁcantly faster than in response to surprising trials. The
pattern of a steep decrease after a surprising trial for both surprise/
update and surprise/no-update trials indicates that in trials +1, a
correct prediction about the trial location is generated, which diﬀers for
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials. In other words, if par-
ticipants failed to update their predictions on surprise/update trials, or
conversely, if they did update their predictions on surprise/no-update
trials, they would expect the wrong location on trials +1, and thus,
have slower ﬁxation latencies on that trial in the condition in which the
Fig. 2. An example stimulus image that shows the position and size of an area of interest (AOI).
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error had occurred.
3.1. Experiment-1: Infant experiment
To test our hypotheses we ﬁrst ran a 2×4 repeated measures
ANOVA with trial type (surprise/update, surprise/no-update) and trial
number (0: surprising trials, trials +1, 2, 3: immediately following
trials) as within-subjects factors. This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of trial number (F (3, 63)= 5.41, p=0.002, η2=0.21) and
a marginally signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type (F (1, 21)= 3.47,
p=0.077, η2=0.14). Data revealed no trial type by trial number in-
teraction (F (3, 63)= 0.20, p=0.896, η2=0.01) suggesting that in-
fants’ ﬁxation latencies did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly for the two types of
surprising trials over the course of trials, which conﬁrmed our hy-
pothesis (compare Figs. 3 and 4).
We ran follow up tests using the Least Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences
method to examine the main eﬀect of trial number. These analyses
revealed that infants were signiﬁcantly faster to look at the target
locations following surprising trials (trials 0 vs. trials +1: md=46.08,
SE=19.56, p=0.028; trials 0 vs. trials +2: md=58.42, SE=17.96,
p=0.004; trials 0 vs. trials +3: md=80.59, SE=18.35, p=0.000).
3.2. Experiment-2: Adult experiment without instructions
We had predicted that both, infants and adults would show a pat-
tern of responses as illustrated in Fig. 3, if they learn the structure of the
experiment and dissociate between the diﬀerent types of unexpected
information. The data of the adult participants, however, revealed a
diﬀerent response pattern (compare Figs. 3 and 5). Verbal reports in-
dicated that 13 out of 23 adult participants did not detect any structure
in the paradigm and the other 10 participants described diverse com-
plex patterns that were not correct.
To test the response patterns statistically, we used the same analyses
as for the infant experiment. Because Mauchly's Test of Sphericity in-
dicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (p < 0.05),
we used Greenhouse-Geisser corrections. A repeated measures ANOVA
with trial type (surprise/update, surprise/no-update) and trial number
(0: surprising trials, trials +1, 2, 3: immediately following trials) re-
vealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial type (F (1, 22)= 37.08,
p < 0.001, η2=0.63) and a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial number (F
(1.45, 31.93)= 15.19, p < 0.001, η2=0.41). Data also revealed a
signiﬁcant trial type by trial number interaction (F (2.20,
48.29)= 12.46, p < 0.001, η2=0.36). This suggests that adults’
ﬁxation latencies diﬀered for the two trial types over the course of
trials.
Follow up tests using the Least Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences method for
pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal means revealed that adults’
responses in surprising trials signiﬁcantly diﬀered from the im-
mediately following trials (0 vs. trials +1: md=32.05, SE=9.12,
p=0.002; trials 0 vs. trials +2: md=60.44, SE=15.46, p=0.001;
trials 0 vs. trials +3: md=70.77, SE=15.59, p < 0.001). Moreover,
they were signiﬁcantly slower in surprise/no-update trials as compared
to the surprise/update trials (md=38.04, SE=6.25, p < 0.001).
Because data revealed a signiﬁcant trial type by trial number in-
teraction, we investigated adults’ response patterns in diﬀerent trials
separately for each trial type. We ran repeated measures ANOVAs for
each trial type with the trial number (0: surprising trials, trials +1, 2, 3:
immediately following trials) as the within subjects factor, which were
followed up by tests using the Least Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences method for
pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal means. These analyses
revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial number both in surprise/
Fig. 3. An illustration of the predicted ﬁxation latencies on surprise/update,
surprise/no-update and surrounding trials (i.e. expected trials) if participants
diﬀerentiated the two types of surprising trials. Trials 0 indicate surprising trials
(surprise/update or surprise/no-update). Trials −1 are the trials immediately
before, which were expected, whereas trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials
immediately following surprising trials. Please note that if trial 0 is a surprise/
update trial, the target stimulus of trial +1 appears at the same location as in
trial 0, whereas if trial 0 is a surprise/no-update trial, the target of trial +1
appears at the same location as in trial −1.
Fig. 4. Fixation latencies on surprise/update, surprise/no-update and sur-
rounding trials (i.e. expected trials) for 14-month-old infants. Trials 0 indicate
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials themselves. Trials −1 are the
trials immediately before surprise/update or surprise/no-update trials, whereas
trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials.
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
Fig. 5. Fixation latencies on surprise/update, surprise/no-update and sur-
rounding trials (i.e., expected trials) for uninstructed adults. Trials 0 indicate
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials themselves. Trials −1 are the
trials immediately before surprise/update or surprise/no-update trials, whereas
trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials.
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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update (F (1.99, 43.85)= 12.69, p < 0.001, η2=0.37) and surprise/
no-update trials (F (1.62, 35.62)= 16.53, p < 0.001, η2=0.43).
Similar to infants, adults were signiﬁcantly faster to ﬁxate the targets in
the trials immediately following surprise/update trials (trials 0 vs. +1:
md=78.33, SE=17.98, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. +2: md=78.71,
SE=19.87, p=0.001; trials 0 vs. +3: md=76.05, SE=18.31,
p < 0.001).
Whereas adults showed the predicted response pattern for trials
following the surprise/update trials, this was not the case for surprise/
no-update trials (compare Figs. 3 and 5). Interestingly, unlike infants,
adult participants seemed to struggle to learn about the surprise/no-
update trials and showed marginally slower ﬁxation latencies in the
trials immediately following surprise/no-update trials as compared to
the preceding surprise/no-update trials (trials 0 vs. +1: md=−14.23,
SE=7.13, p=0.059). Nevertheless, they became signiﬁcantly faster to
look at the target locations in the following trials (trials 0 vs. +2:
md=42.17, SE=13.26, p=0.004; trials 0 vs. +3: md=65.49,
SE=14.62, p < 0.001).
3.2.1. Additional analyses for Trials +1
Our analyses revealed that there was no indication that adults dis-
sociated the two types of surprising trials. Given these unexpected re-
sults, we explored the data further to investigate what kind of strategies
adults employed during the experiment. We reasoned that if partici-
pants had a tendency to update their predictions erroneously in sur-
prise/no-update trials, they would ﬁrst look at the location of the sur-
prise/no-update bee in the immediately following trials, although the
bees did not appear at this location in these trials, which would result in
increased ﬁxation latencies. For comparison, we focused on the gaze
behavior of both infants and adults during the trials immediately fol-
lowing surprise/no-update trials and systematically investigated the
gaze patterns during this time window1. We ﬁrst determined the
number of infant and adult participants who shifted their gaze at least
once to the location of the surprise/no-update trials (i.e. at the location
of trials 0) also on the immediately following trials (i.e. trials +1). Data
revealed that among 29 infants, nine infants expected the following
target to appear at the location where the surprise/no-update target
appeared at least once (range 1 to 3 times). Put diﬀerently, on average,
only in 5.99% of all trials +1 following surprise/no-update trials, in-
fants expected the target to appear at the same location as the previous
surprise/no-update target location (i.e. at the location of trials 0). These
analyses provide further evidence that infants learned the structure of
the experiment and adjusted their models accordingly.
The adults, however, showed a diﬀerent pattern. Among 23 adults,
20 of them expected the target to appear at the same location as the
previous surprise/no-update trial, in the trial after, at least once (range
1 to 11 times out of 14). In adults, the average percentage of trials +1
in which they performed a gaze-shift to the location of the previous
surprise/no-update location was 29.17%. These results show that,
without instructions, adults had a tendency to update their predictions
following surprise/no-update trials approximately 5 times more than
the infants did. Together, these results indicate that it was more chal-
lenging for adults than infants to diﬀerentiate the two types of sur-
prising trials. Instead, they expected the target of the trials following all
surprising trials to occur at the same location as the surprising trial
itself. Further analyses comparing the results of infants and
uninstructed adults are reported in Supplementary Material.
3.3. Experiment-3: Adult experiment with instructions
Because adults showed diﬀerent patterns than predicted by our
hypothesis, we tested another group of adults who were provided with
instructions about the task. We expected adults to perform the task as
predicted (i.e. they dissociate the two types of unexpected trials) when
the uncertainty about the task demands were reduced (cf. O’Reilly
et al., 2013). For statistical testing, we applied the same analysis pro-
tocol as reported earlier. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the
assumption of sphericity had been violated (p < 0.05); therefore, we
used Greenhouse-Geisser corrections. A repeated measures ANOVA
with trial type (surprise/update, surprise/no-update) and trial number
(0: surprising trials, trials +1, 2, 3: immediately following trials) in-
dicated a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of trial number (F (1.75,
43.64)= 45.64, p < 0.001, η2=0.65) and a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
trial type (F (1, 25)= 24.13, p < 0.001, η2=0.49). Follow-up tests
showed that adults were signiﬁcantly faster in the trials immediately
following surprising trials (trials 0 vs. trials +1: md=124.24,
SE=17.69, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. trials +2: md=158.35,
SE=20.25, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. trials +3: md=145.78,
SE=19.06, p < 0.001). Furthermore, they were signiﬁcantly slower
in surprise/no-update trials as compared to the surprise/update trials
(md=28.75, SE=5.85, p < 0.001).
Data also revealed a signiﬁcant trial type by trial number interaction
in this group (F (1.92, 48.06)= 9.99, p < 0.001, η2=0.29). As illu-
strated in Fig. 6, this interaction eﬀect was driven by the slower ﬁxation
latencies following surprise/no-update trials. This might be because
participants were speciﬁcally informed about where the targets appear
following surprise/update trials (i.e. expected trials), which was not the
case for the surprise/no-update trials. Participants were only informed
that following surprise/no-update trials, the targets would not appear
where they appeared in the preceding surprise/no-update trial.
To have a closer look at the response patterns in diﬀerent trial types,
we ran separate repeated measures ANOVAs for each trial type with
trial number (0: surprising trials, trials +1, 2, 3: immediately following
trials) as the within subjects factor, which we followed up with tests
using the Least Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences method for pairwise comparisons
of estimated marginal means. Data revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
trial number both in surprise/update (F (1.94, 48.53)= 46.48,
p < 0.001, η2=0.65) and surprise/no-update trials (F (3,
75)= 29.25, p < 0.001, η2=0.54). Fixation latencies of adults sig-
niﬁcantly decreased in the trials immediately following surprise/update
trials (trials 0 vs. trials +1: md=163.51, SE=20.61, p < 0.001; trials
0 vs. trials +2: md=170.36, SE=21.35, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. trials
+3: md=143.33, SE=19.47, p < 0.001). Moreover, participants
were signiﬁcantly faster to look at the target locations also in the trials
immediately following surprise/no-update trials as compared to the
surprise/no-update trials (trials 0 vs. trials +1: md=84.96,
SE=19.94, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. trials +2: md=146.34,
SE=20.94, p < 0.001; trials 0 vs. trials +3: md=148.23,
SE=20.03, p < 0.001).
4. Discussion
In three experiments, we examined whether infants and adults re-
present the structure of a changing experimental environment. Infants
learned the predictive value of diﬀerent color cues (i.e. update vs. no-
update) and adjusted their models when required. Interestingly, unlike
infants, especially when not guided by instructions, adults seemed to
have a tendency to update their models throughout the experiment.
When adults received instructions about the task, their performance
was slightly improved.
Although infants and adults who were not instructed had exactly the
same prior knowledge about the task speciﬁcs, we observed clear
1 To process this data, we deﬁned a second area of interest (AOI) to check if
participants gazed at the location of the agent in the preceding trial, in trials
following surprise/no-update trials. This additional AOI was active while the
bee image was on the screen, in the trial immediately following surprise/no-
update trials. We checked the number of trials per participant when they gazed
at this second AOI. To calculate the percentage values, we divided the number
of trials +1, in which participants gazed at this second AOI, by the total
number of trials +1 for each participant, multiplied this value with 100 and
took an average of all percentage values.
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diﬀerences in their responses. We argue that this ﬁnding might be ex-
plained by infants being more open to accommodate current informa-
tion than adults were. It could be that infants are more ready to learn
from evidence and adjust their beliefs ﬂexibly, due to having less pre-
cise beliefs about the parameters of the environment (Courville et al.,
2006). Adults, on the other hand, might have adhered to one strategy to
reduce the uncertainty and ignored some of the available evidence. This
argument is further supported by the additional analyses showing that
after surprise/no-update trials, uninstructed adults initially expected
the target to appear at the surprise/no-update location, just like after
surprise/update trials. They then looked at the correct target location,
resulting in increased ﬁxation latencies in trials immediately following
surprise/no-update trials. This response pattern shows that adults had a
tendency to update their models following all unexpected items, despite
the evidence suggesting a diﬀerentiation between unexpected cues.
Relatedly, one might claim that because of poorer memory skills,
infants were not able to represent prior information and their responses
were driven solely by the current data (i.e. simply looking at a spot
where something appears). Therefore, one could argue that a me-
chanism based on forgetting previous information might have helped
infants to succeed on this task. Although neural and modeling work
would be useful to explore this argument further, it is insuﬃcient to
account for infants’ pattern of responses. If infants’ looking responses
were only driven by current observations, we would have observed an
even response pattern across all trials. First, infants would be equally
fast to look at the target locations regardless of whether the target
appears at an unexpected location or not. That is, they would not show
increased ﬁxation latencies in surprising trials, if they did not use prior
information about where the targets appear. Second, if infants did not
learn that targets appear at diﬀerent locations based on whether the
previous trial is an update or no-update trial, they would not be fast
again to look at the correct target locations in the trials immediately
following these trials (see Fig. 4). Therefore, it is unlikely that infants
did not encode any previous information to generate predictive models
and their responses were driven purely by the current input.
The diﬀerences between infants and adults show fascinating simi-
larity to ﬁndings suggesting that young children use evidence to learn
novel causal links better than adults do (Gopnik, Griﬃths, & Lucas,
2015; Lucas, Bridgers, Griﬃths, & Gopnik, 2014). For example, in a
study by Lucas et al. (2014), adults and 4-year-old children had to infer
how a machine played music when some objects were placed on top of
it. In some cases, a single object activated the machine (i.e. individual
principle) whereas in other cases it was a combination of objects (i.e.
combination principle) activating the machine. Children learned both
principles to make the machine play music and selected the right
principle when they had to infer which principle should work. How-
ever, adults tended to stick to the individual principle that they learned
earlier and placed single objects to activate the machine, although
current evidence was against this principle. Similarly, in the current
paradigm, particularly without instructions, adult participants seemed
to adhere to one explanation (i.e. the unexpected appearance of the
bees means an update of location), although evidence suggested a dif-
ferentiation between diﬀerent forms of surprising information. Because
adults exploited one strategy (i.e. update), they were less open to ex-
ploring alternative explanations, which hindered them from performing
the task successfully.
One alternative explanation could be that although the number of
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials was matched, overall, the
bee stimulus used on surprise/update trials was seen more frequently
than the surprise/no-update bees, as the same bee appeared at the same
spot as “expected” bees in the subsequent trials. Accordingly, it might
be that participants, particularly infants, might have failed to learn
about the rare surprise/no-update items or simply ignored them as
distractors. One way to address this limitation could have been to use a
fourth color of the bees to signal surprise/update trials, which could
have made the task less understandable, especially for the infants.
Despite this limitation, our results suggest that infants did treat
surprise/update trials diﬀerently from surprise/no-update trials, which
is observed in decreased ﬁxation latencies in the trials following the
surprising trials. If infants did not learn what the surprise/update colors
represented, they would not be fast to look at the correct bee locations
in the trials after the surprise/update trials. Similarly, if infants did not
learn that surprise/no-update bees were not predictive of future bees,
they would not be equally fast to look at the correct bee locations in the
trials following the surprise/no-update trials. This is especially crucial
given that in these trials both the color and the location of the bees were
diﬀerent from the preceding (surprise/no-update) trials incurring a
larger reaction time cost than the trials after the surprise/update trials.
Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that infants learned that
the surprise/update and surprise/no-update bees have diﬀerent pre-
dictive value with regard to which stimuli they should expect on the
following and subsequent trials.
Another alternative explanation could be that, due to having com-
plex priors, adult participants failed to use the information value of the
simple perceptual cues such as color to perform the task as expected. In
other words, the complex prior knowledge adults brought to the ex-
periment might have dominated their predictions, which resulted in
overlooking the perceptual cues. Relatedly, it could be argued that,
especially in the absence of instructions, adults had to detect the
structure (e.g., an update model) and the parameters (e.g., the target
will now appear where it just appeared) of the current task to make
predictions accordingly (Braun, Mehring, & Wolpert, 2010). For adults,
detecting the structure of the environment (and the parameters thereof)
might have been a challenging task because they had to narrow down a
large hypothesis space to ﬁgure out the general structure and the
parameters of the environment2. For infants, the task might have been
easier, as there is ample evidence in the developmental literature
showing that infants detect even complex statistical regularities
(Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Ruﬀman, Taumoepeau, &
Perkins, 2012; Saﬀran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and younger learners
are better than the older ones and adults (Kuhl, 2004; Lucas et al.,
2014). In summary, it might be that having more prior knowledge
prevented the adults to perform the task as expected.
It should be noted that results obtained from adult participants in
Fig. 6. Fixation latencies on surprise/update, surprise/no-update and sur-
rounding trials (i.e., expected trials) for instructed adults. Trials 0 indicate
surprise/update and surprise/no-update trials themselves. Trials −1 are the
trials immediately before surprise/update or surprise/no-update trials, whereas
trials +1, +2 and +3 are the trials immediately following surprising trials.
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
2 This argument is supported by the verbal reports from uninstructed adults.
Adults who reported structure detection tried to describe diverse complex
patterns that were incorrect.
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the current study show diﬀerences to the ﬁndings of the 2013 study by
O’Reilly and colleagues. Several methodological diﬀerences regarding
the number of trials, the stimuli and duration of the presentation might
have led to the discrepant results, which make it diﬃcult to compare
the studies. First, in the O’Reilly study, participants completed a 300-
trials session for the eye tracking study whereas, in the current study,
due to infants’ limited attention span, it was not possible to include
many trials in the experiment. Moreover, O’Reilly and colleagues used
dots in their task that appeared at a faster rate and stayed on the screen
relatively short (i.e. 350ms). One could argue that, in the current study,
because the presentation of the images were slow (e.g. the bees stayed
on the screen for 1.5 s), it was more likely that adults had more time to
think of more complex explanations, which might have resulted in
overlooking simple perceptual cues. In addition, in the O’Reilly study,
the update dots were chromatically colored, whereas the one-oﬀ dots
were gray, which might have made the diﬀerence between the two
types of surprising trials more salient, as it was clear for the participants
that colored dots signaled updating whereas gray dots did not. We used
diﬀerently colored bees to keep infants’ attention directed to the screen,
which might have made the distinction between the two types of sur-
prising trials less salient. Taken together, although the 2013 study by
O’Reilly and colleagues inspired the current work, there were several
diﬀerences in the methods, which make it diﬃcult to discuss replic-
ability.
5. Conclusions
Here, we demonstrated that infants and adults generate internal
models that represent the statistics of a dynamic environment. Infants
learned the predictive value of diﬀerent cues and adjusted their models
only when the cues signaled a change in the structure. Unlike infants,
especially when not guided by instructions, adults ignored the evidence
and had a tendency to update their models each time they observed a
change in the structure. We argue that infants are more open to learning
from evidence and update their beliefs ﬂexibly, which is an advanta-
geous learning strategy to represent dynamic environments. This
strategy enables developing systems to adjust to changes easily, a ca-
pacity that is key to adapting to novel environments.
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